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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Security Assistance Support

Providing for the National Security

or

A Cause of Instability

Are We At the Crossroads of Change?

by

Colonel John J. Weeden

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United States Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy  
Medford, Massachusetts 20115

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*"The U.S. conventional arms transfer policy promotes restraint, both by the U.S. and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be destabilizing or dangerous to international peace, at the same time, the policy supports transfers that meet legitimate defense requirements of our friends and allies, in support of our national security and foreign policy interests..."*

Extracted from Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 34), White House Fact Sheet on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 17 February 1995.

In a statement before Congress, General Colin Powell spoke about the United States' interests in security assistance policy. His philosophy regarding collective security and international stability was oriented to those countries the United States considers friendly:

"Dollars invested to help friends and allies build indigenous military capabilities and to gain their confidence

bring tremendous returns in helping the U.S. to meet its regional objectives."<sup>1</sup>

He expressed concern, however, for potential problems arising from one country's engagement in policies directed toward another country's need to protect itself from its enemies. It was his opinion that the large diversity of causes of instability would result in greater demands on the United States to provide friendly countries with support to assist them in defending against their regional enemies. He contended that some countries "will be undemocratic; and many will be threatened by internal unrest, terrorism, drug runners, or guerrillas. As a result, they will be natural candidates for many forms of security assistance."<sup>2</sup>

A certain rationale regarding the appropriateness of the United States in providing military resources to qualifying countries was evident throughout his testimony. Certainly, questions might arise as to why the United States would employ this tactic since there may be no discernible threat to its own national security. Powell professed that there is a correlation between a support-receiving state and the United States when considering potential conflict within the supported state: "When we nurture the capability of other nations to protect their own national security interests, we are effectively lessening the

potential for greater burdens on our own forces and furthering the cause of regional security cooperation."<sup>3</sup>

General Powell saw appreciable value in security assistance programs. However, in that security assistance is comprised of many forms of economic, training, and military assistance, there are differing views concerning the level of ubiquity on the part of the United States in implementing these programs. R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on 1 January 1995. In relation to General Powell's statements, Woolsey debated the value of security assistance. The concern he expressed to Congress was that "[advanced conventional weapons and technology] are a growing military threat... [and] have the potential to significantly alter military balances, and disrupt military operations and cause significant U.S. casualties."<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, in testimony before the same Senate committee on 10 January 1995, voiced similar concern about other countries' acquisition of technology and weapon systems that, if employed, "won't lead to military defeat of U.S. forces, [but] certainly hold out the prospect of casualties."<sup>5</sup>

These differing views posit questions regarding the rise of security assistance as an effective political, economic, and military tool used to enhance the security of U.S. allies and

friendly nations. The United States is an arms-producing country whose goal is to avoid creating any degree of instability or conflict by the injection of security assistance into what may have otherwise been a stable nation or region.

By definition, "security assistance" is a broad topic which provides for defense articles, military training, and sales of military equipment for the official purpose of "enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats."<sup>6</sup> Components of security assistance include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). The focus of this article will be on Foreign Military Sales and arms sales. "Foreign Military Sales" will be defined as a "nonappropriated program through which governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States."<sup>7</sup>

As an arms-exporting country, the United States is cognizant of the potential diminution of regional stability resulting from the foreign military sales component of security assistance to a recipient country. All FMS activities are evaluated "in the context of their impact on social and economic development programs and recipient countries, and for their impact on regional arms races."<sup>8</sup>

The basis for what is now referred to as "security assistance" is found in the principle legislation, The Arms Export Control Act of 1976. It was during President Nixon's administration that new national security doctrine was promulgated, "emphasizing sending arms instead of troops to defend U.S. interests."<sup>9</sup> Commonly referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine", it transitioned from a policy providing military aid to a policy encompassing weapons sales. Those sales grew at a prodigious rate. "U.S. foreign arms sales jumped from \$1.4 billion in 1971 to over \$16 billion by 1975."<sup>10</sup> Congress became alarmed at this rapidly burgeoning policy of marketing arms and thereby positioning the United States for unwanted overseas conflicts.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 attempted to reform the runaway arms sales policies and to "bring about arrangements to reduce international trade in implements of war and to lessen the danger of outbreak of regional conflict and the burdens of armaments."<sup>11</sup> Presidents since Nixon have tailored their security assistance policies commensurably with their political philosophies and economic interests. By his Presidential Directive 13 (PD 13), President Carter made an ineffective attempt to control the magnitude of foreign military sales and assistance but, like his predecessors, saw arms transfers and security assistance as a foreign policy instrument. He believed

that the use of security assistance as a political tool had value in "shoring up allies like the beleaguered Shah of Iran, maintaining a 'balance of power' in volatile regions of the Middle East, and paving the way for U.S. military intervention..." <sup>12</sup>

The United States is undeniably engaged in the big business of marketing arms and military services. Is there a nexus between being the undisputed reigning purveyor of these articles and services and the national security interests of the United States? The Cold War culminated with the world transitioning from a bipolar international system to one dominated by a single superpower, albeit non-hegemonic. The United States stands as the principle leader of the free world with no serious global rival. In assessing threats to America's security, then, the essence of the discussion must certainly contain comments on the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. "Now that the defense of Saudi Arabia and mastery of its oil resources [has] been duly anointed as a 'vital national security interest' of the United States, the question [is] how to best...secure that interest." <sup>13</sup>

The Gulf War saw many state actors combine their military forces in a coalition to repel the aggression of a rogue state. In evaluating the United States' security assistance to the region following the war, the bond between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been sealed by the commitment of the former to

maintain regional stability by increasing its assistance by way of arms transfers, although the Bush administration, at the time, sought to curb weapons export to that region. However, "even without a credible enemy to justify the billions of dollars in U.S. transfers to the region...U.S. sales [have] accelerated, accounting for 57 percent of weapons deals in the region from 1989 through 1992."<sup>14</sup> Ironically, a 1987 U.S. Naval War College statement regarding U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf was less prophetic than most analysts would have desired when that policy contended that "a key element...is security assistance and arms sales programs. U.S. weapons and associated training help our friends in the region address their legitimate defense needs, deter a spillover from the Iran-Iraq war, and reduce the possibility that U.S. forces would have to intervene in a crisis."<sup>15</sup>

The United States has committed to remaining actively engaged militarily around the globe. Policy calls for power projection of U.S. forces and the strengthening of our alliances. President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement requires that U.S. forces be prepared to quickly deploy and fight. The National Military Strategy supports the tenets of Clinton's plan by viewing security assistance in peacetime engagement as a vital element intended to "improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals,

relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability." <sup>16</sup>

Ostensibly, the National Military Strategy calls for "cooperative programs" which focus on coalition designs and commitments with friendly countries. "Providing vital training and U.S.-manufactured weapons systems increases the access and influence of the U.S. military and improves the interoperability of [these] potential coalition members." <sup>17</sup> This strategy also asserts that security assistance "deters aggression in unstable regions and provides a cost-effective alternative to maintaining larger U.S. forces in the region." <sup>18</sup>

Generally, if one deduces that the United States alone cannot be expected to safeguard the free world's security interests, then security assistance and foreign military financing would call for friendly nations to share the overall burden of collective and regional security. By reducing the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement in unstable regions or potential areas of conflict, this theory becomes most efficacious with the reduced demands on U.S. military resources. However, do U.S. policies on security assistance and the supplying of arms promote stability, or do they increase the likelihood of conflict? Is the commonality of arms truly a hallmark of coalition warfare? Is the United States creating a "forward presence" and resident access to overseas bases, or is it simply fueling the fires of conflict by its security assistance

policies? Are allies and friendly nations being provided assistance and support against discernible enemies, or simply against abstractions like "regional instability" and theoretical uncertainties? Are security assistance policies consistent with the United States' national security interests, or are they primarily only an extension of special interests? These questions fuel the debate on whether national security strategies, policies, and doctrine, as they regard security assistance, are esoteric and irrelevant or legitimate and purposive.

On 17 February 1995, President Clinton promulgated his policy on conventional arms transfers by his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-34). In that document, he supports the continuum that his predecessors established regarding the relationship security assistance and military sales have with foreign policy and domestic economic considerations. He asserted that "transfers of conventional arms [are] a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional stability, and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces."<sup>19</sup> On the one hand, the policy adduces an essential relational connection whose characteristics are formed by sophisticated weaponry and military articles and services provided under the provisions of U.S. law to friendly countries

for the ostensible purpose of promoting stability and fostering those political and economic objectives considered worthy and desirable. On the other hand, Clinton's policy fails to identify or even imply "that conventional arms control in general would serve U.S. security interests; nowhere does it acknowledge any connection between the global spread of conventional arms and regional warfare and instability."<sup>20</sup>

In 1993, U.S. foreign military sales accounted for \$22.5 billion, or 70 percent of the world market. In that year, over 140 countries received U.S. military articles and services.<sup>21</sup> Arguments may be made about providing assistance to U.S. friends and allies in support of future coalition warfare and to create a commonality of weapon systems. However, in that over 50 wars occurred during 1993-94, and in considering the magnitude of the U.S. security assistance effort, there is concern by some over the fact that this assistance is being obtained by Third World, undemocratic regions, and that those activities are in fact fanning the fires of ethnic and territorial conflict. A 1995 report published by the World Policy Institute points out:

- From FY 85 through 94, parties to 45 conflicts have taken delivery of over \$42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry.
- Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts occurring during 1993-94, 90 percent (45 of 50) involved

one or more parties that had received U.S. weapons or military technology in the period leading up to conflict.

- In 18 of 50 [conflicts], the United States has been a major supplier to at least one side in the dispute.
- As of the end of 1994, the United States was providing military goods and services to more than half (26 of 50) of the countries involved in internal or external conflicts. <sup>22</sup>

This may be no more than an extension of an American attitude concerning the relative importance of security assistance, arms sales, and military assistance when viewed in terms of economic security within a capitalist state. In today's buyer's market of military articles and services, the United States is a leading competitor in filling the demand. Indeed, President Clinton may see this form of commerce as a vital component in the U.S. equation that provides for the economic well-being of the U.S. arms industry and, in turn, the economy. The perceived international benefit of this would be the promotion of regional stability and balance of power. It appears somewhat paradoxical, though, when assistance is provided to opposing sides of conflict concurrently: Greece/Turkey and Persian Gulf sheikdoms/Israel for example.

Presidential Decision Directive 34 includes the goal of promoting "restraint, both by the United States and other

suppliers, in transfers of weapon systems." Ironically, the "Pentagon forecasts that the U.S. share of the world's arms market will increase from about 50 percent in 1993 to 63 percent by the year 2000."<sup>23</sup> U.S. weapons exported during 1994 by the use of several security assistance programs include 702 battle tanks, 1,036 armored combat vehicles, 127 large caliber artillery, 82 combat aircraft, 5 attack helicopters, and 324 missiles and launchers.<sup>24</sup> Mr. Frank Besson, Director of Security Assistance for the Army, has noted that arms sales are "big business for the Army". As of December 1995, the Army was tracking more than 5,000 active foreign military sales cases worth about \$47 billion.

The activity mentioned above is representative of the size and scope of the arms export and sales side of Army security assistance. It is apparent that the technical quality and potential lethality of the items is extremely high. In revisiting Director Woolsey's warnings, weapon systems, technology, and assistance delivered by the United States to countries throughout the world may pose a dilemma for military planners and strategists. The United States has been engaged in military operations in several conflicts since 1990, including those in Somalia, Panama, Haiti, Iraq, and Bosnia. Each of these countries, except Bosnia, had received U.S. security assistance including training, weapon systems, and military technology.

Whether or not the use of this equipment and knowledge obtained from U.S.-provided assistance contributed in any way to an increased threat to U.S. forces is unclear. For example, the fact that Somalia's dictator Mohamed Siad Barre may have been advantaged by the receipt of U.S. small arms, mortars, and artillery, draws attention to the need to further define U.S. national security interest as it relates to peace-keeping operations and support to countries whose political structure is non-democratic.

Surely, the United States has enjoyed technological supremacy and military superiority in recent engagements and will always be faced by opposing forces in a variety of environments over which there is little control. Knowledge of the enemy's weapons and military technology could prove advantageous--on the other hand, those systems, if used against U.S. forces, may pose real and legitimate problems. "I'd much rather go to war against a country that has bought U.S. equipment, than a country that's bought comparable equipment from France, or from Russia, or from Israel, or from any other country."<sup>25</sup> Rear Admiral John Snyder, Deputy Director of the Naval International Programs Office, expressed his opinion about the advantage that planners have when they know the enemy's equipment. "If they got the equipment from the United States, I know damn well what they got in their inventory, I know what their readiness is...I also know what

their tactics are, and I know how to defeat their weapons." <sup>26</sup>

Secretary of Defense William Perry echoed this observation last year when he said that "U.S. forces must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some previously produced in the United States." <sup>27</sup>

Admiral Snyder raised an interesting example which shows conflict arising from the debate on whether U.S. policy is based on rhetorical derivations as seen in papers and statements, or on the enhancement and sustenance of the U.S. defense industrial base. Clinton's policy on assistance tends to support and maintain the current defense industrial complex. The debate on whether the lives of U.S. service members are put at risk when they are committed to military action in regional conflicts because of this policy appears to wane in the shadow of commercial motivations. The declaratory statements regarding restraint are therefore obfuscated by the rhetoric of politics.

Thorough exploration of the relationship of security assistance and foreign military sales to the domestic economic impact on the United States is appropriate since such assistance has been viewed as "contributing to full employment, serving as an instrument of (domestic and foreign) political influence supporting industrial policies by providing a legitimate venue for the monetary support of high technology industries and sustaining a national autonomy by supporting a national arms

industry."<sup>28</sup> A plausible deduction from this is that security assistance is viewed as a political tool used to link a domestic economy to foreign policy and diplomacy. In turn, the exportation of military technology is limited by the potential of that technology to threaten forces of the exporter or its allies were recipient nations to become adversaries.

The economic reality of President Clinton's arms transfer policy is clearly stated in PDD-34. He directs that "the impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base [will be taken into account] whether [a] sale is approved or not." As with preceding administrations, the Clinton administration evaluates the economic impact of security assistance decisions. The Defense Advisory Group was established by the State Department to offer advice regarding the commercial aspect of weapon sales. Fifty-seven of the Group's 60 members represent the arms industry. Whether the State Department's and President Clinton's decisions are affected by this Group is a reasonable concern; that the Group's recommendations may be based more on being a caretaker for military contractors than on providing an impartial conduit for decision-making is clear. This may be inconsistent with the Group's responsibility to recognize risks to U.S. security interests and armed forces associated with security assistance activities.

What would be the effect of a substantial reduction in U.S. foreign military sales? A 1992 Congressional Budget Office study provides an answer to that question. If there was a substantial cut in sales to the Middle East, for example, it would "affect less than 2 percent of all defense workers and less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the nation's total work force."<sup>29</sup> This hardly represents a grave threat to the U.S. economy. However, politicians at all levels acquiesce to the demands of the defense industry because of the political fallout that would result if jobs--regardless of the number--were affected by their decisions. Industry is then the winner in a favorable economic environment co-created and reinforced by the government sector. This environment is continuously fed by the system that created it. "The U.S. Army [for example] is revamping its system for handling foreign military sales to improve coordination with industry and boost exports of Army-related equipment."<sup>30</sup> Another indicator of the economic side of this business is seen in the charter of The Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM). It calls for training Pentagon bureaucrats and military personnel in the art of arms sales, and administering a multi-billion dollar industry on behalf of U.S. military contractors. It truly is a big business.

Another dimension of arms sales is the offset arrangements associated with foreign military sales which are financed through

the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF). Offsets are generally deferred as industrial and commercial compensation practices provided to foreign government customers. They are inducements for purchasing military goods and services.

Foreign governments who make large weapons purchases from the United States bring, in some cases, significant financial impact on their countries, which can result in a political downside and domestic displeasure. Therefore, the United States attempts to ameliorate that situation by providing U.S. grant aid (a form of cash assistance) or loans through the FMF program for the purpose of purchasing U.S. weapons and assistance. No other arms supplier provides offsets as large as does the United States.

The Arms Export Control Act directs that FMF loans and grants will not be used for procurements outside the United States. A 1990 policy on offsets has as an exception a provision that U.S. funds may pay for offsets in security assistance transactions in accordance with "currently established policies and procedures." Since that phrase was undefined in the Act, the policy has resulted in providing for no prohibition on U.S. funds used for offsets in security assistance sales.

There are several elements of offset agreements to consider: Coproduction agreements allow foreign countries to produce all or part of a U.S. weapon system overseas. Foreign Military

financing assistance is provided by the U.S.; Buybacks allow foreign countries to produce defense components related to U.S. weapon systems being acquired by that country. The U.S. then purchases these components from the foreign country; Procurements are purchases of foreign-produced components of weapon systems that are not being acquired by the foreign country. There is a quid pro quo factor that requires the U.S. manufacturer to purchase unrelated military components in exchange for a foreign country's purchasing other components or systems from the U.S.; Corporate investment on the part of the U.S. in non-defense firms in foreign countries in exchange for those countries' investment in U.S. companies not engaged in defense-related industries.

Regarding buybacks and procurements, it is clear that the United States not only pays for foreign-made components, but that those components ultimately become part of U.S. weapon systems purchased by the U.S. military as a result of the offset. This may be a questionable business practice to some.

Foreign Military Financing, a component of U.S. security assistance, is a vital part of U.S. foreign policy relevant to national interests and international security. With respect to the discussion on the economic impact of security assistance activity, "offsets reduce the employment, industrial, and other economic benefits that normally accrue to the United States from foreign military sales."<sup>31</sup> The net result of offsets can cause

the loss of U.S. employment because of, in some cases, the requirement for U.S. industry to subcontract from foreign countries business that would have normally been performed in the United States. On 6 October 1994, 32,000 Boeing machinists went on strike in several states. Their strike focused on offsets and those agreements that required Boeing to direct production, work, and technology back to the foreign government making the purchase under the provisions of the Defense Procurement Act of 1992 as a condition of the sale.

In recounting the discussion regarding the correlation of foreign military sales to the support and sustenance of U.S. industry, and assuming, correctly or not, that the political claim that U.S. foreign military sales sustain American jobs, it becomes apparent that these decisions actually dilute U.S. employment and cause economic strain and damage to U.S.-based businesses. "Increased international competition allows customers to extract very favorable deals from suppliers. Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis said in 1993 that 'the demand for offsets is growing with practically every arms purchaser demanding some form of offset.'" <sup>32</sup>

Employment concerns and economic impact notwithstanding, "direct" offsets, whereby a foreign country making a purchase receives work and technology directly related to a U.S. weapon system by way of producing the system or its components, may give

rise to serious security considerations. Tacit approval is given by the United States to foreign countries to enhance their own arms industries through this program, one over which the U.S. has little, if any, control.

"While offsets are an integral part of the world marketplace, they are not needed to assure a sale of a U.S. weapon system and may not be appropriate when the purchasing country is using FMF funding."<sup>33</sup> Again, the United States stands alone as an arms supplier who provides security assistance and allows offsets.

The Foreign Assistance Act provides authority to the President to draw down defense articles in certain exigent situations. The purpose of this Act is to provide military assistance to a foreign country with the assumption that the requirement cannot be satisfied in other ways. The military articles come from stocks of The Department of Defense. The President's drawdown authority includes equipment, defense services, and military education and training. The aggregate value of a drawdown is limited to \$75 million. Since 1993, the U.S. Army has been notified to conduct eight drawdowns accounting for \$74 million. During the same period, the U.S. Navy and Air Force drew down \$10.8 and \$11.3 million, respectively. Since 1980, the services have been subject to \$780 million in drawdowns as the result of Presidential authority.<sup>34</sup>

An alternative to the outright sale of military articles is leasing. Imbedded in the law, the President is given authority to lease articles if "he determines that there are compelling foreign policy and national security reasons for providing such articles on a lease basis rather than on a sales basis..."<sup>35</sup> A requirement of the country contracting to lease U.S. equipment is that it pay the United States all costs associated with the lease. Leases are limited to five years and need to be justified by the President to Congress unless an emergency exists which threatens the national security interest of the United States, and therefore requires immediate action on the lease.

A need for international defense cooperation among the United States and countries with whom it is friendly or allied justifies providing U.S.-exported military articles and services. This is especially true in regard to developing countries whose need for defense equipment cannot be met internally, and, if adequately armed, whose armed forces would work cooperatively with those of the United States in defeating or deterring aggression. Sales of such articles are approved when seen as being consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States. Also as a matter of policy, the United States evaluates the recipient country's financial ability to pay for the assistance. It also assesses the social and economic impact produced by the receipt of the articles and assistance.

As a leader in the world community, the United States has always sought to lessen the potential of outbreak of regional conflict. There is a financial side to U.S. endeavors in this area: The Arms Export Control Act requires that all financial obligations to the United States, when collected, be transferred to the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury. A requirement of law is that "sales of defense articles and defense services which could have significant adverse effect on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be kept to an absolute minimum."<sup>36</sup> The President, therefore, is required to inform Congress of his intent to sell defense articles and services if there is a potential adverse effect on the combat readiness of the armed forces. The law also requires that the President justify sales by certifying that they are important to the security of the United States.

The Congress of the United States was concerned about military readiness and the relationship security assistance has to the security of the U.S. The effect this program has on military readiness is generally immeasurable because of the certification process provided by law and regulations regarding the subject. However, it has always been a command imperative to carefully consider any impact security assistance activity has on military readiness. For example, the decision that the U.S. Army will spend \$1.2 billion over the next three years to upgrade M-1

tanks to the M-1A2 configuration for export only to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia certainly has been subjected to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act that regard readiness and to the scrutiny and opinion of America's military leadership.

With respect to the security of the United States, the provisions of law regarding this issue were extrapolated to various security assistance proposals, including the Clinton administration proposal to sell to Turkey 120 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) which, heretofore, have not been sold to any foreign country. "The administration says the \$130 million deal will further U.S. foreign policy and national security by improving the military capabilities of Turkey while enhancing weapon system standardization and interoperability."<sup>37</sup> A formidable weapon system contracted by Loral Corporation of Camden, Arkansas, the ATACMS was quite effective in the Persian Gulf War. "According to the Pentagon's 1992 report... 'During one ATACMS strike, more than 200 unarmored vehicles were destroyed as they attempted to cross a bridge.'"<sup>38</sup>

What does the future hold for security assistance programs? Are we at the crossroads of deciding whether to carry on business as usual or to revamp the entire system in order to promote international security and stability and to fully satisfy the intent of the legislation? Congressional purview over just one component of the security assistance system, foreign military

sales, is clearly defined by the fact that it seeks "to initiate multilateral discussions for the purpose of reaching agreements among the principle arms suppliers and arms purchasers and other countries with respect to the control of the international trade of armaments."<sup>39</sup> Congress calls upon the President to keep vigil over the sale of conventional weapons and to seek arms control arrangements in his or her pursuit of restraint.

Threaded throughout the Congressional charge is language expressing concern for the "national security interests of the United States", and cautions on overarming nations of the developing world. The rapacity of the less-than-developed world for U.S. military articles and services has continuously challenged the many administrations to remain loyal to the intent of the laws regarding foreign assistance and armed export control.

Policies on security assistance have evolved over time and have been influenced by the also-evolutionary world order. Administrations have consistently sought to justify assistance to countries only after having analyzed 1) their internal tensions, 2) the affect such assistance would have on regional peace, security, and stability, and 3) U.S. national security interests and the capability of the assistance along with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country as it regards its legitimate needs of security and defense. Even so, in light of

this, security assistance still presents itself as a big business enterprise of the United States. The Congressional Research Services (CRS) report, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994", indicates that the United States "exported more weaponry in 1994 than the rest of the world combined."<sup>40</sup> The CRS also indicates that the United States is heavily involved in the supply of articles, services, and weapons to developing countries, averaging approximately \$15 billion in sales per year. Since the end of the Cold War, assistance to developing countries from the United States has more than doubled. Furthermore, when analyzing security assistance activity on a near-term basis, and considering the administration's goal of "enlarging democracies," there appears to be a contradiction: "...even when combining developed and developing countries, dictatorial governments received 59 percent of the nearly \$80 billion of U.S. weapons transferred during [1991-1994]."<sup>41</sup>

In 1993, ethnic warfare in forty-eight countries was representative of the vicissitudes of international stability and order. The disquieting fact that thirty-six of these countries received assistance and weapons from the United States brings to focus the debate on the value and propriety this topic is given by various sectors of government and the military. Whether it is a "flawed strategic vision, political opportunism, and plain old-fashioned greed [that has produced] an aggressive arms sale

policy on the part of the U.S. government, despite the clear and growing dangers...for the security of the citizenry and the maintenance of a democratic foreign policy", <sup>42</sup> or simply a logical and orderly evolution of policy based on historical perspective and international alignment tends to create a dilemma. Those who subscribe to the former theory might use as their example a lesson learned by the United States in Afghanistan. The effort to destroy, or at least recover, Stinger antiaircraft missiles supplied to Afghan rebels in the 1980s because of the perceived threat those weapons may have for the Saudis and other U.S. allies reinforces the "flawed strategic vision" concept in the minds of those who lean that way. However, decision-makers, at the time, may have had indisputable justification for the transaction which has caused current debate.

If the United States is at a juncture in determining which direction to take in its quest to maintain peace and stability while promoting democracy in the world through the use of security assistance as a tool, then now may be an opportune time to look at alternatives. Armed chaos throughout the world has imposed a state of disorder. The infusion of imported military articles and services may contribute to this disorder. With the end of the Cold War, it may now be difficult to justify the sale of arms and services to the Third World in order to arrest

Russian aggrandizement. Ethnic strife, territorial disputes, religious separatism, and economic contests have collectively replaced the conventional Soviet threat experienced during the Cold War.

If there is a so-called policy of restraint in the marketing of U.S. military articles and services, then there should be discernible and verifiable compliance with it. The national security of the United States should be the determinant for any decisions regarding the sale of military items: the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces is superior to all other considerations. The soldier in the "fox hole" should not be affected in his ability to fight and defend himself or herself in any way because of decisions made by the political authority regarding the disposal of military equipment. The military leadership is a hedge against the largess of the military-industrial base and a promoter of peace and security while at the same time serving the Commander-in-Chief in defense of the nation. If the sale of military goods and services is seen as a threat to peace and democracy anywhere, policies should then be revisited and validated. New policies, in that respect, should be derived from lessons learned and applied to the United States' position in the community of nations. If the United States cannot unilaterally control the profusion of security assistance, in all of its forms, it should then be advisable to redress the situation by

the engagement in and expansion of talks designed to ameliorate conditions seen as destabilizing. Moratoria on arms sales may be appropriate; educating recipient countries on the need for negotiation and discourse is essential if we are to achieve change and effect success in this area.

Embedded in the identity of security assistance is a large bureaucracy that has awesome control over policies and programs for which it is responsible. If we are at a crossroads, a turn in the direction of alternative management of the program may be necessary to effect change and adaptation. The economic aspect of the program demands new policy and political conversion. The petitioning and influencing of Congress by well-organized groups may eventually have to become subordinate to the future security of not only this nation, but of all nations of the world. Any person or corporation having an influence on security assistance decisions should be subject to careful review by the executive and legislative branches of government.

Democratization of countries receiving security assistance support from the United States should always be the primary motive behind the program. A loss of a single soldier's life should never result from misplaced security assistance or political misgiving of policy. Other tools should be used by the political leadership to supplant non-democratic governments with democracies and to develop new strategic policies.

The United States cannot accomplish change by itself--in the entrenched business of security assistance, other nations need to fall in behind America's lead in its endeavor for change. All major world powers should show restraint, as the United States professes to do through its Constitutionally-empowered legislative system and executive authority. A quasi-official department, internationally appointed and not affiliated with the United Nations, should be designed and implemented under the auspices of member nations. The United States should take the lead in this consortium in developing new procedures applicable to the world community for all security assistance activity.

In the interim, "In April, experts from 28 countries will meet in Vienna to launch the Warrenar Arrangements to coordinate exports of conventional arms...and help track potentially destabilizing military buildups around the world."<sup>43</sup> This forum may become the new "manifest destiny" of the United States, leading the global community into a newly-defined environment of international relationships whose basis is cooperation and stability for the 21st Century.

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